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UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: FREE LABOR OR VALUABLE 
LEARNING EXPERIENCE? 
Robert J. Tepper* & Matthew P. Holt† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, internships have become an integral 
part of the college curriculum. Many degree programs either 
strongly recommend or require that students complete one or 
more internships.1 Current business and accounting 
accreditation standards require evidence substantiating a 
curriculum where “students engage in experiential and active 
learning designed to improve skills and the application of 
knowledge in practice.”2 Internships, particularly those offered 
in private firms, have long been thought to advance those 
objectives. 
This paper discusses the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of internships. It then discusses current legal 
 
* C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D.; Principal Lecturer, Accounting Department, Anderson School of 
Management, University of New Mexico. 
† J.D., Assistant Professor, College of Business, Finance Department, New Mexico 
State University. 
 1  See Karel A. Updyke & James Sander, A Survey of AACSB Accredited 
Institutions and the Use of Work Experiences as Part of the Business Curricula, Fall 
2005 J. ACAD. BUS. EDUC. at 118, 120, 125, available at 
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=cob_papers 
(reporting that despite the benefits of internships, only 26 of 133 responding AACSB 
schools required an internship). Recent survey data suggests that 63.2% of graduating 
seniors participated in an internship or co-op program. Nat’l Ass’n of Colls. & Emp’rs, 
Class of 2013: Majority of Seniors Participated in Internships or Co-ops, NACEWEB.ORG 
(June 26, 2013), https://www.naceweb.org/s06262013/internship-co-op-during-
college.aspx.  Of that number, 52.2% were paid; 47.8% were unpaid. NAT’L ASS’N OF 
COLLS. & EMP’RS, THE COLLEGE CLASS OF 2013: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (Nov. 2013), 
available at http://www.naceweb.org/uploadedFiles/Content/static-
assets/downloads/executive-summary/2013-student-survey-executive-summary.pdf. 
 2  AACSB, 2013 Business Standards, Learning and Teaching Standards, 
AACSB.EDU, http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/standards/2013-business/learning-
and-teaching/ (last visited July 31, 2014); see also AACSB, 2013 Accounting Standards, 
Learning and Teaching Standards, AACSB.EDU, 
http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/accounting/standards/2013/learning-and-teaching/ 
(last visited July 31, 2014). 
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challenges involving unpaid internships primarily in the 
private sector.3 These challenges involve application of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). The FLSA requires, 
with certain exceptions, that employees engaged in interstate 
commerce are paid minimum wage and time-and-a half for 
workweek hours over forty, and that employers maintain 
adequate records. Courts employ different standards to assess 
whether an unpaid intern is an employee subject to the Act. 
Most apply a fact-intensive “totality of the circumstances” 
approach and conclude that if the primary beneficiary of the 
arrangement is the intern, then the intern is not an employee. 
However, a minority of courts requires the employer to satisfy 
all elements of a six-factor test developed by the Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division currently in a “Fact Sheet.” 
This article argues that the Fact Sheet should be accorded 
little deference because it merely interprets a Supreme Court 
decision. Further, it is ambiguous as to the extent that all six 
factors must be met. Additionally, unpaid internships are a 
minefield of potential liability for employers for several 
reasons: (1) uncertainty regarding the applicable standard for 
whether the intern is subject to the Act, (2) non-waivable 
character of the Act,4  (3) opt-in procedures for FLSA claims 
that are fairly easy, (4) potential for fee shifting, and (5) 
existence of similar state-law provisions with similar 
remedies.5 
 
 3  “Internship” is a term used to describe a variety of arrangements between a 
sponsor, a student, and an academic institution. Sponsors may include for-profit 
employers, as well as private, not-for-profit, and governmental entities. Moreover, 
internships may be paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, for academic credit or not, 
and required by an academic institution or merely recommended.  NAT’L ASS’N OF 
COLLS. & EMP’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: UNPAID INTERNSHIPS (June 2010), available at 
http://www.naceweb.org/advocacy/position-statements/unpaid-internships.aspx?land-
intern-lp-1-adv-ps-ui-08152014 (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).  The variety of 
arrangements sometimes “makes it difficult to apply common and consistent 
standards, guidelines, and applicable policies.”  Id.  This article primarily addresses 
for-profit, private sector internships (rather than the large number of public and non-
profit internships that are not part of the analysis) though our suggestions for 
improving internships may well apply to all internships. 
 4  Though the Act is non-waivable, it has a two-year limitations period with a 
three-year period for willful violations.  29 U.S.C.A. § 255(a) (West 2014); Haro v. City 
of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2014).  These limitation periods should 
serve to limit liability. 
 5  See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a) (West 2014) (overtime); CAL. LAB. CODE § 
1182.12 (West 2014) (minimum wage); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 232 (McKinney 2014)  
(overtime for certain employees); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney 2014). Of course, a 
State minimum wage may exceed the federal minimum wage, thereby increasing 
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More significantly, assuming that an unpaid internship 
falls within a safe harbor with respect to the Act, is it ethical to 
ask students to work for no pay? We conclude that it is, when 
adequate safeguards are in place that ensure a meaningful 
educational experience open to all who are qualified. Finally, 
the paper discusses what steps both schools and employers 
should take to limit liability and provide a better internship 
experience for students. 
II. WHY INTERNSHIPS? 
In many fields, students are encouraged to seek out intern-
ships, preferably the paid variety.6 Students, schools, and em-
ployers all have reasons for favoring internships. 
A. Student Perspectives 
Internships are widely believed to expose the student to the 
practical side of a discipline and provide relevant work experi-
ence. Students see internships as a way to gain much-needed 
experience, improve job skills, and potentially receive an offer 
of future employment with a firm or government entity, even if 
not with their specific employer.7 College credit is often an ad-
ditional benefit necessitating little extra work beyond the in-
ternship itself. 
Even where there is not potential employment, students 
expect to gain valuable contacts through networking and to 
build a stronger resumé. This may take the form of professional 
references or public recognition for projects, e.g., being listed in 
a film’s end credits or a published work’s acknowledgements.  
Students also likely improve job-hunting skills in the process of 
applying and interviewing for internships. Further, obtaining a 
competitive internship is often viewed as an achievement in 
and of itself, distinguishing a student from his or her peers. 
 
liability. 
 6  A recent survey of 2013 graduates suggests that a higher percentage of those 
completing paid internships received at least one job offer (63.1%) compared to those 
who completed unpaid internships (37%) or no internship at all (35.2%). Nat’l Ass’n of 
Colls. & Emp’rs, Class of 2013: Paid Interns Outpace Unpaid Peers in Job Offers, 
Salaries,  NACEWEB.ORG  (May 29, 2013), http://www.naceweb.org/s05292013/paid-
unpaid-interns-job-offer.aspx. The results may not be surprising given that paid 
internships are increasingly becoming a “tryout” for paid positions. 
 7  David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student 
Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 241 (1998). 
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B. School Perspectives 
From a school’s perspective, an internship program demon-
strates that it is pursuing active and experiential learning for 
its students. Moreover, supplying students for internships may 
improve a school’s relationship with an employer and encour-
ages the employer to look to the school as a source for future 
interns and full-time employees. Outside the classroom, faculty 
members often are called upon to consult with industry.  An in-
ternship program can solidify a relationship between individu-
al professors and a firm and pave the way for future consulting 
opportunities. A school can also charge tuition in exchange for 
college credit for internships, often with reasonable levels of 
faculty involvement, making it unnecessary to deploy addition-
al faculty to manage internships. 
Concerns include placing too much emphasis on internships 
where less time is spent with the actual academic content of 
the degree program. Additionally, by requiring unpaid intern-
ships as a prerequisite for paid employment, employers may 
essentially be imposing an unpaid training period on all stu-
dents who apply. Most faculty do not want to participate in 
programs that might exploit students and interns lack the pro-
tection that even a probationary employee might have. 
C. Employer Perspectives 
Employers can often be motivated by altruistic reasons—
paying it forward.  Taking on an intern is a way to introduce a 
new entrant to an industry, or to a profession and to cultivate a 
future colleague. It is a way for employers to give something 
back to a school, or at least sample what the school has to offer 
in terms of prospective employees. Employers may like the op-
portunity, or feel pressure to have an internship program, to 
have first choice among highly qualified students.  Students 
are probably more likely to accept an offer from an employer 
known through an internship than pursue the unknown. 
Possibly the greatest incentive internships offer employers 
is a low risk and inexpensive method of appraising suitability 
for eventual hire.8 Many firms extend entry-level offers to in-
terns who successfully complete an internship.  Finally, an in-
tern may provide help with the tasks at hand, although most 
 
 8  Id. at 241–42. 
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professional employers recognize that in a meaningful intern-
ship, the investment in training the intern generally exceeds 
an intern’s contribution. 
Given such advantages, what can go wrong? The next sec-
tion discusses common problems with internships. 
III. THE TROUBLE WITH INTERNSHIPS 
Student complaints include: internships rarely lead to jobs, 
training is poor or non-existent, supervision is minimal, tasks 
are mundane, hours are often long, and the work has little ap-
plicability to professional pursuits.  Perhaps reminiscent that 
“no good deed goes unpunished,” providing an internship op-
portunity has generated complaints that  unpaid internships in 
the for-profit, private sector9 are just that: unpaid, but in viola-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”).  This is 
because interns are alleged to be “employees” under the Act, 
and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime.  Employers 
may take no comfort in knowing that an intern fully under-
stands that the internship is unpaid. The protections of the Act 
cannot be waived.10 There are cases where courts have held 
that people who willingly worked without compensation were 
 
 9  Generally, volunteers who perform services for state or local governmental 
agencies are not considered employees under the FLSA if they receive no compensation 
(or merely expenses, reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee).  29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(4)(A) 
(West 2014); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100, 553.106(a) (2013).  The FLSA also contains an 
exemption from minimum wage and maximum hour provisions for employees 
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,” 29 
U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (West 2014), but that exemption requires that the employee be 
paid a salary, 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200(a)(1), 541.300(a)(1), 541.600 (2013).  The FLSA has 
a provision for employment under a special certificate which might enable an employer 
to pay less than minimum wage (95%) to learners, apprentices, and messengers.  29 
U.S.C.A. § 214(a) (West 2014); 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.300 (definitions), 520.400–520.412 
(2013).  The certificate is dependent upon prevention of curtailment of employment 
opportunities, 29 U.S.C.A. § 214(a), so an employer would have to demonstrate an 
effort to recruit experienced workers, 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.403(a)(1), 520.404(e) (2013).  A 
similar provision (at 85% of the minimum wage) exists for employment of student 
learners enrolled in an accredited educational program and employed part-time 
pursuant to a bona-fide vocational training program.  29 U.S.C.A. § 214(b) (West 2014); 
29 C.F.R. § 530.300 (2013); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.500–520.508 (2013).  Of course, these 
provisions require compensation, which is inconsistent with an unpaid internship, and 
depend upon a demonstrated need for employees (a shortage of applicants not in need 
of training). 
 10  Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985); 
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); Brooklyn Sav. 
Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945); Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Servs., Inc., 
725 F.3d 603, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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in fact employees and entitled to compensation.11 Obviously, 
the potential for litigation over a claim for unpaid wages and 
overtime may dampen employers’ enthusiasm to participate in 
unpaid internships. 
A. Employer Responsibilities Under the Act 
Under the Act, with certain exceptions, employers must pay 
employees engaged in interstate commerce at least minimum 
wage12 and time-and-a half for hours worked over forty in a 
workweek.13 The Act has several purposes, including protection 
for workers from long hours and substandard wages, protection 
for employers from unfair competition from employers who 
might pay their workers substandard wages, and the reduction 
of unemployment by requiring overtime compensation.14 Re-
quiring that all employees be paid ensures fair wages are paid 
to others in the industry by reducing the incentive to hire those 
who would work for substandard or non-monetary compensa-
tion.15 
Employers are also required to keep adequate records 
concerning the hours worked by their employees.16 In a 
successful claim for unpaid wages, an intern is entitled to an 
additional, equal amount as liquidated damages unless the 
 
 11  See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 306 (holding religious 
foundation workers were entitled to compensation); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 
1207, 1208 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding uncompensated trainees were employees); Bailey v. 
Pilots’ Ass’n, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (concluding pilot-boat apprentice 
was employee). 
 12  29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a) (West 2014); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, ___ 
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013). 
 13  29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1) (West 2014). 
 14  29 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West 2014); Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 710, n.25; 
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945); Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 
721 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 15  Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302 (“If an exception to the Act 
were carved out for employees willing to testify that they performed work ‘voluntarily,’ 
employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make 
such assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act.”); Lucas, 721 F.3d at 936–
937 (applying same rationale to undocumented aliens); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 
F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (same). 
 16  29 U.S.C.A. § 211(c) (West 2014); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2(a)(7), 516.5 (2013). 
Where an employer has not kept adequate records, the employee may prove the 
amount of time by “just and reasonable inference.”  Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946); Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 363–64 
(2nd Cir. 2011). The burden then shifts to the employer to prove the precise amount by 
negating the reasonableness of the inference; lacking that, a court may award an 
approximate amount.  Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88. 
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employer can demonstrate that its non-compliance was in good 
faith and it had reasonable grounds to believe its conduct was 
not in violation of the law.17 Where the employer has not kept 
adequate records, an employee need only prove approximate 
amounts.18 
Under the Act, “employer” and “to employ” are defined 
broadly.19 An employee is “any individual employed by an 
employer.”20 “Employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.”21 
“Work” incorporates “physical or mental exertion (whether 
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and 
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 
employer.”22 It can be on-site or off-site and the employer has 
the responsibility to ensure that any work it does not want is 
not performed.23 Not surprisingly, paid interns engaged in 
interstate commerce are considered employees subject to the 
Act.24 The question remains as to whether interns who are not 
paid are employees, and therefore entitled to the protections of 
the Act.25 
 
 17  29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260 (West 2014). The burden is on the employer to show 
subjective good faith and the objective reasonableness of its conduct, and liquidated 
damages are the norm in these types of cases. Reich v. S. New England Telecomms. 
Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 70–71 (2d Cir. 1997). A successful claimant also is entitled to a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.  29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2014); Black v. SettlePou, LLC, 
732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 18  Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88. 
 19  Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947); Rosenwasser, 
323 U.S. at 362 (“A broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be 
difficult to frame.”); Lucas, 721 F.3d at 934 (noting the “sweeping definitions of 
‘employer’ and ‘employee’”). 
 20  29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1) (West 2014). 
 21  29 U.S.C.A. § 203(g) (West 2014). 
 22  Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944); 
see also Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
 23  29 C.F.R. §§ 785.12, 785.13 (2013). 
 24  See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206(a) (minimum wages) & 207(a) (maximum hours) 
(West 2014).  Paid interns do not appear to come within any exemptions.  See 29 
U.S.C.A. § 213 (exemptions) (West 2014). 
 25  The definition of an employee under the FLSA is the same as for the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(3) (West 2014). Thus, if an 
unpaid intern is an employee under the FLSA, she may be entitled to protection under 
the FMLA provided she meets length of service requirements. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(A) 
(West 2014). Courts look at common law employment concepts, including the right to 
control the means and manner of performance, in deciding whether a volunteer is an 
employee under Title VII. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997). Most 
circuits would require some kind of remuneration to consider an intern an employee 
entitled to protections under various anti–discrimination statutes including Title VII, 
the ADA and ADEA. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 
(5th Cir. 2013); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 
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B. Tests for Determining Employee status 
The Act does not define “intern” or “extern,” so the analysis 
of whether an unpaid intern is an employee begins with 
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., which considered unpaid 
trainees.26 The Portland Terminal Co. offered a course in 
practical training for prospective yard brakemen. The course 
involved seven to eight days of training, during which time the 
trainee was instructed and supervised by the working yard 
crew. The trainees were not compensated for their time.27 
The Department of Labor brought suit against Portland 
Terminal, alleging that the trainees were employees under the 
FLSA, and should have been paid for the time they spent 
training. Portland Terminal denied that the trainees were its 
employees. 
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the trainees were 
not employees under the Act. In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court made several observations: 
1. The trainees did not displace any regular employees.28 
2. The trainees’ work did not expedite the company’s 
business, and in fact it actually impeded the company’s work.29 
3. The trainees were not guaranteed a job, though they 
became eligible for employment if they successfully completed 
the program.30 
4. The trainees were not paid, and did not expect to be paid 
for the time spent training.31 
 
1998); O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116; Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 
73 (8th Cir. 1990). But see Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t., Inc., 656 F.3d 
348, 353–54 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering remuneration but one factor to consider in 
whether an employment relationship exists); Fichman v. Media Center, 512 F.3d 1157, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). Other statutory schemes, however, may have different 
definitions of “employee,” so that an employee for purposes of the FLSA may not be 
entitled to other statutory protections. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (distinguishing the scope of “employee” under ERISA as not being 
as broad as it is under the FLSA). 
 26  330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947). Portland Terminal had a companion case that 
reached the same result. Walling v. Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 330 U.S. 
158  (1947). 
 27  The trainees who successfully completed the course and were certified as 
competent were eligible to be hired by Portland Terminal. Beginning in 1943, if the 
trainees were hired, Portland Terminal then gave them a retroactive allowance of 
$4.00 per day for their training period. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150. 
 28  Id. at 149–50. 
 29  Id. at 150. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
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The Court analogized the situation to a public or private 
vocational school: 
Had these trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or 
private vocational school, wholly disassociated from the 
railroad, it could not reasonably be suggested that they were 
employees of the school within the meaning of the Act.  Nor 
could they, in that situation, have been considered as 
employees of the railroad merely because the school’s 
graduates would constitute a labor pool from which the 
railroad could later draw its employees.  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act was not intended to penalize railroads for 
providing, free of charge, the same kind of instruction at a 
place and in a manner which would most greatly benefit the 
trainees.32 
The Court closed by noting that the railroad received no 
“immediate advantage” from the work done by the trainees, 
and then held that the trainees were not employees.33 
1. Regulatory interpretation of Portland Terminal – Fact Sheet 
#71 
In 2010, the Department of Labor issued Fact Sheet #71, to 
provide “general information to help determine whether 
interns must be paid the minimum wage and overtime under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.”34 The substance of Fact Sheet 
has appeared in response to inquiries about interns and a 1980 
Wage and Hour publication concerning the employment 
relationship.35 Although claiming only to provide “general 
information,” the current Fact Sheet sets the tone early when it 
articulates an assumption that interns are employees: 
Internships in the “for-profit” private sector will most often be 
viewed as employment, unless the test described below 
relating to trainees is met.  Interns in the “for-profit” private 
 
 32  Id. at 152–53. 
 33  Id. at 153. 
 34  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1 (April 2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
 35  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 5303033, at *2 (May 17, 2004) (“The 
Department of Labor has consistently applied this test in response to questions about 
the employment status of student interns.”); WH Pub. 1297, at 4–5 (Rev. 1980, 
Reprinted Aug. 1985), available at 
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Inside_Bar/Labor/Employment%20Relationship.pdf. 
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sector who qualify as employees rather than trainees must be 
paid at least the minimum wage and overtime compensation 
for hours worked over forty in a workweek. 
The Fact Sheet itself claims that the Supreme Court held 
that the phrase “suffer or permit to work” cannot be 
interpreted “so as to make a person whose work serves only his 
or her own interest an employee of another who provides aid or 
instruction.” This appears to be a reference to Portland 
Terminal, which did in fact hold that a person who serves only 
his own interest is not the employee of a business that provides 
aid or instruction. Note, however, that Portland Terminal 
never held that someone who serves his own interest—and 
benefits another in the process—becomes an employee of the 
person benefitted. 
The “guidance” from Fact Sheet #71 is embodied in six 
criteria that it sets forth.36  The Department of Labor gives 
conflicting instructions on the import of the criteria. Before 
listing the criteria, the Fact Sheet acknowledges that the 
determination of whether an intern is an employee “depends on 
all the facts and circumstances,” suggesting a “totality of the 
circumstances” type of analysis. After listing the criteria, 
however, the Fact Sheet suggests that the criteria provide a 
bright line test: “if all of the factors” are met, the intern is not 
an employee under the FLSA. In addition to insisting upon 
application of all the factors, the Fact Sheet explains that the 
exclusion is “quite narrow” implying that the failure to meet 
one is determinative. 
The Fact Sheet’s factors parallel, but do not exactly mimic, 
points raised by the Court in Portland Terminal, as 
illuminated in the following table. 
Fact Sheet #71 Portland Terminal 
1. The internship, even 
though it includes actual 
operation of the facilities of 
the employer, is similar to 
training which would be 
given in an educational 
environment; 
1. Had a vocational school 
offered the same training, 
the school would not be 
deemed the students’ 
employer. 
 
 36  The six criteria have been used by the Department of Labor since 1967, Reich 
v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993), although “intern” 
has sometimes been substituted for “trainee” and “internship” for “training period.” 
Tepper Holt, Edited v.2.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/3/15  3:17 PM 
1] UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 333 
 
2. The internship 
experience is for the benefit 
of the intern; 
 
2. The training would most 
greatly benefit the 
trainees.37 
3. The intern does not 
displace regular employees, 
but works under close 
supervision of existing staff; 
 
3. The trainees did not 
displace any regular 
employees. 
4. The employer that 
provides the training 
derives no immediate 
advantage from the 
activities of the intern; and 
on occasion its operations 
may actually be impeded; 
 
4. The railroad received no 
immediate advantage by 
providing the training. 
5. The intern is not 
necessarily entitled to a job 
at the conclusion of the 
internship; and 
 
5. The trainees were not 
guaranteed a job, though 
they were eligible for 
employment if they 
successfully completed the 
training. 
6. The employer and the 
intern understand that the 
intern is not entitled to 
wages for the time spent in 
the internship. 
6. The trainees were not, 
and did not expect to be, 
paid for the time spent 
training. 
 
It is not surprising that most courts reject a literal 
application of the Fact Sheet’s criteria and instead adopt a 
“totality of the circumstances” or an “economic realities” test. 
Perhaps more importantly, courts appear to have uniformly 
 
 37  New employees are not always entitled to be compensated for training time, 
particularly where the training is a pre-condition of employment and does not involve 
productive work.  29 C.F.R. § 785.27 (2013); Chao v. Tradesmen Int’l., Inc., 310 F.3d 
904, 910 (6th Cir. 2002); Ballou v. Gen. Elec. Co., 433 F.2d 109, 111–12 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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rejected the suggestion that an intern must be working “solely” 
for his own benefit or will otherwise be deemed an employee. 
Instead, courts focus on who is the “primary beneficiary” of the 
relationship. 
2. Totality of the circumstances 
The totality of the circumstances approach seems to be 
mandated by the Supreme Court itself. Just a few months after 
the decision in Portland Terminal, the Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,38 which also 
dealt with the question of what constituted an “employee” 
under the Act. More specifically, the issue was whether the 
worker was an employee or whether he was an independent 
contractor, a frequent issue under the Act. The Court reviewed 
the traditional tests for differentiating between employees and 
independent contractors, and then noted: 
We think, however, that the determination of the relationship 
does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the 
circumstances of the whole activity.39 
A number of cases have cited to Rutherford in support of 
the proposition that the totality of the circumstances should be 
used to determine whether someone is an employee. For 
example, in Mendel v. Gibraltar40 the issue was whether 
firefighters were employees under the Act. The firefighters 
were referred to as volunteers. They could decide what calls to 
respond to, but received an hourly “stipend” when they were on 
call.  Quoting from Rutherford, the court stated that the 
“circumstances of the whole activity” had to be evaluated and 
that the determination of whether the firefighters were 
employees hinged on the economic realities of the situation.41 
Because the hourly “stipend” paid the firefighters 
approximated typical wages paid to professional firefighters, 
the court determined that they were, in fact, employees. 
In a similar case, the Tenth Circuit was called on to 
determine whether firefighters were entitled to compensation 
for the time they spent in firefighter academy.42  Specifically 
 
 38  331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
 39  Id. at 730. 
 40  727 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 41  Id. at 569–70. 
 42  Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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rejecting a rigid application of the criteria contained in the Fact 
Sheet, the court found that the process of distinguishing 
between an employee and an independent contractor (as was at 
issue in Rutherford) was analogous, and agreed that no one 
factor was dispositive, but instead a decision should be based 
on the economic realities after looking at the total situation.43 
Looking to the “economic realities,” the court concluded that 
the potential firefighters attending the academy were not 
employees. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that no single factor is 
controlling, instead the economic realities of the situation have 
to be understood. The Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation had 
a number of unpaid “associates” working for it in a variety of 
capacities.44 The Department of Labor brought suit, claiming 
that the associates were employees. The Foundation, however, 
argued that it was a charitable and religious organization that 
was helping the less fortunate with behavioral problems by 
providing them with a place to work. The associates themselves 
testified that they were volunteers and not employees. The 
Court said that the test of employment was one of “economic 
reality”45 and analyzed all of the circumstances before 
concluding that the associates were employees, largely because 
the work that they were doing directly supported a commercial 
enterprise that was in direct competition with businesses that 
paid their workers.46 
3. Deference to the Fact Sheet 
Some courts have afforded the Fact Sheet substantial 
deference,47 while a small minority of courts completely reject 
the Fact Sheet.48 Other courts have decided that it is entitled to 
 
 43  992 F.2d at 1026–27. 
 44  Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 292. 
 45  Id. at 301; accord Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 
(1961). 
 46  The Department of Labor took a similar position in response to charity 
bagging as a fundraiser: students carried shoppers’ groceries to their cars for donations 
only. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2002 WL 32406599, at *2–3 (Oct. 7, 2002). 
 47  See Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 48  See, for example, Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, which noted 
that the Fact Sheet was “a poor method for determining employee status in a training 
or education setting.  For starters, it is overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach, where no one factor (or the absence of one factor) 
controls.”  642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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some deference.49 However, of those that have given the Fact 
Sheet deference, only a few have explained the reasoning for 
such deference. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
the deference. The Court has found that a reviewing court must 
give deference to the rules, actions, and decisions by 
administrative agencies in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.50 and 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,51 which set forth two distinct standards that are generally 
referred to as Skidmore deference and Chevron deference.52 
Skidmore deference and Chevron deference are markedly 
different in several important regards. Chevron deference 
requires courts to give controlling deference to an agency 
interpretation of a statute if the statute is ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation reasonably resolves the ambiguity.53 
Chevron deference, however, is applicable only if (a) Congress 
intended to confer authority on the agency to issue 
interpretations having the force of law and (b) the 
interpretation in question was issued according to the format 
Congress contemplated would be eligible for Chevron 
deference.54 
If an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to 
deference under Chevron, then the interpretation must be 
analyzed under Skidmore. Under Skidmore, a court can 
consider, but is not bound by, the agency’s interpretation. In 
deciding whether to apply Chevron deference or Skidmore 
deference, the first step is typically to determine whether 
 
 49  See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 
1993) (giving Skidmore deference); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (giving Chevron deference); Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, 504 F. 
App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Referring to the Fact Sheet, the court in 
Kaplan noted that the “rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator 
under [the FLSA], while not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority, do 
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.” Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35 (quoting Dade 
County v. Alvarez, 1234 F.3d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 50  323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 51  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 52  A third type of deference, Auer deference, has no application in this matter.  
In Auer v. Robbins, the Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulation should be deferred to by the courts as long as that interpretation 
was not clearly erroneous.  519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). The Fact Sheet, however, is not a 
regulation, and is not subject to Auer deference. 
 53  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 54  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
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Congress intended to confer on the agency the authority to 
issue interpretations that have the force of law. In this case, 
determining whether Congress intended for the Department of 
Labor to issue interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
that would have the force of law is critical. Fortunately, the 
Supreme Court seems to have already answered this question, 
as Skidmore itself involved an interpretive bulletin adopted by 
the Department of Labor to implement the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. 
In Skidmore, seven employees of Swift & Co. filed suit, 
seeking to recover compensation for time they spent waiting for 
work. The trial court found that the waiting time was not 
compensable. Apparently the trial court felt “restricted by its 
notion that waiting time may not be work.” This conclusion was 
based solely on the position the administrator of the 
Department of Labor took in a bulletin it had issued.55 The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting that it was up 
to the courts, and not to the Department of Labor, to 
authoritatively interpret the law. 
Seguing from deciding whether the courts must defer to the 
Department of Labor’s interpretive bulletin56 to evaluating 
whether the interpretive bulletin should be instructive, the 
Court clearly agreed that the administrative agency’s 
interpretation was entitled only to some deference. The weight 
of the deference should depend 
[U]pon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.57 
Given that Skidmore involved the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
and that the Supreme Court ruled that the courts could be 
guided by, but were not bound by, the interpretive bulletins 
adopted by the Department of Labor, it seems settled that 
Skidmore deference, and not Chevron deference, should apply 
to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. In fact, some courts giving deference to the Fact 
Sheet have cited to Skidmore as the reason for giving it 
 
 55  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 56  The Court, of course, did not refer to such deference as Chevron deference, as 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., would not be decided 
for another 40 years. 
 57  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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deference.58 
Skidmore, however, seems to concern itself with situations 
in which an administrative agency is interpreting a statute (or 
even regulations).59 In contrast, the Fact Sheet does not seem 
to interpret the statute so much as it interprets the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Portland Terminal.60 There is nothing to 
suggest that the Department of Labor is in a better position to 
interpret case law than a judge, and therefore little, if any, 
deference should be given to the Fact Sheet. 
An analogous issue, raised in Melvin v. Astrue was whether 
and how much deference should be given to an Acquiescence 
Ruling that had been made by the Social Security 
Administration.61 An Acquiescence Ruling (“AR”) is a ruling 
that the Social Security Administration issues that interprets a 
holding of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals concerning 
the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 
argued that an AR was ignored and claimed that the AR was 
entitled to deference under Skidmore. The district court 
disagreed: 
Further, Skidmore deference is tempered where the 
administrative official lacks expertise in the area.  See 
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269.  Plaintiff fails to explain why the 
Commissioner is better able to interpret a federal appellate 
decision than a United States District Court.  No rational 
explanation appears to exist.  Accordingly, the court rejects 
plaintiff’s argument that Skidmore deference applies to ARs.62 
Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that the Wage and Hour 
 
 58  Some courts have given deference to the Department of Labor’s factors based 
upon Chevron deference, which provides that, where Congress intended for the agency 
to complete a legislative scheme, the agency’s interpretation will be upheld unless 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843–44.  Perhaps these cases consider the Fact Sheet as interpretative of FLSA, in 
addition to Portland Terminal.  See McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th 
Cir. 1989); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(Sotomayor, J.).  Generally, Chevron deference is afforded regulations where there has 
been notice and comment and adjudications; the Tenth Circuit has held that the factors 
are entitled to Skidmore, but not Chevron deference.  Reich v. Parker Fire Protection 
Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 59  See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008). 
 60  Of course, the argument can be made that the Fact Sheet is really 
interpreting the terms “employer,” “employee,” and “employ” as used in the FLSA.  29 
U.S.C.A. § 203(d), (e)(1), (g) (West 2014). 
 61  602 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702–03 (E.D.N.C. 2009). 
 62  Id. at 703; accord Carter v. Astrue, Civ. A. CBD-11-2980, 2013 WL 4461579, 
at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2013). 
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Division of the Department of Labor is better able to interpret 
a decision from the United States Supreme Court than another 
court. 
Moreover, the Department of Labor has taken positions 
inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the Fact Sheet. 
Although the Fact Sheet claims that if all six factors are met 
the intern or trainee is not an employee, the prefatory 
comments in the Fact Sheet expressly say a determination of 
whether participants in a particular program would be 
employees “depends upon all of the facts and circumstances.”  A 
“facts and circumstances” analysis negates the idea of a bright-
line rule.63 A bright-line rule is also inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by the Department of Labor. In an opinion it 
issued in 1967, the administrator clearly set forth a totality of 
the circumstances approach: 
The Court has made it clear that there is no single rule or test 
for determining whether an individual is an employee, but 
that the total situation controls.  The Court has indicated a 
number of factors which help to determine whether an 
employment relationship exists.64 
Notwithstanding the language of the Fact Sheet, at oral 
argument in a case involving the question whether trainees 
were employees, the Department of Labor agreed that the court 
was not bound to an all-or-nothing standard.65 
Given the fact that the Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet 
really does not interpret the statute, and given the fact that the 
Department of Labor has taken inconsistent positions on this 
very issue, the Fact Sheet is entitled to little deference. An “all 
or nothing” approach may have the virtue of simplicity, i.e., not 
meeting any one factor means the intern is an employee.66 In 
 
 63  See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers, 
38 VT. L. REV. 555, 591 (2014). 
 64  Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Op. Wage–Hour Adm’r No. 638 (July 18, 1967)). 
 65  Id. at 1026–27.  Despite this, the position of the Department of Labor since 
promulgation of the Fact Sheet seems to advance an “all-or-nothing” approach, i.e., if 
any of the six factors are not met, the intern will be deemed an employee. See, e.g., U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 2146931, at *2 (May 17, 2004) (“[P]rovided the six 
criteria listed below are met . . . the students will not be considered employees.”); U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1994 WL 1004761, at *2 (Mar. 25, 1994) (concluding interns 
were employees under FLSA because “criterion number 4 discussed above would not be 
met”). 
 66  David C. Yamada, The Employment Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 215, 233 (2002). But even with an “all or nothing” approach, the Department of 
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contrast, a “totality of the circumstances” or “economic reality” 
test calls for more factual development and nuanced ad-hoc 
balancing.67 The latter approach, however, is consistent with 
Supreme Court law.  If there is a dispute, the parties should be 
able to stipulate to the basic facts of any internship 
arrangement. If they do not, trial courts are adept at factual 
findings. Given those findings, courts are capable of applying 
the law. Though the “economic reality” test may involve ad-hoc 
balancing, most judges are generalists and engage in ad-hoc 
balancing on a regular basis. 
4. Immediate benefit v. primary benefit 
Many of the cases involving trainees and interns may turn 
on a question that some may call semantic, whether “benefit of 
the intern/trainee” means “sole benefit”. According to the Fact 
Sheet, the trainee/intern is an employee unless the internship 
experience is for the benefit of the intern, which certainly 
implies that it must be for the sole benefit of the intern.  Thus, 
the Department of Labor concluded that an employer offering a 
youth hostel internship must comply with the minimum wage 
and overtime provisions of the FLSA; the employer would 
derive an immediate advantage from the activities of the intern 
in operating the hostel.68  On the other hand, a one-week 
internship program where students shadowed employees did 
not benefit the employer, and indeed may have reduced 
productivity.69  Informal opinions for the Department of Labor 
suggest that an important determinant of benefit is “whether 
 
Labor often forgoes providing an answer for want of adequate factual development 
regarding the factors. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 2146931, at *2 (May 
17, 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2002 WL 32406598, at *2–3 (Sept. 5, 2002); 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032496, at *2 (July 11, 1995); U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032473, at *1 (Mar. 13, 1995). Of course, there are cases 
where the facts so clearly indicate the “intern” is an employee, the matter can be 
decided as a matter of law regardless of the test. See Pfunk v. Cohere Commc’ns, LLC, 
2014 WL 2208012, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2014) (applying FLSA test to Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) claim and holding 
that a compensated employee was not an intern under the totality of the circumstances 
or the six-factor test). 
 67  Yamada, supra note 66, at 233 (contending that a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach requires subjective judgment and analysis by the trier of fact 
and will result in inconsistent results). 
 68  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1994 WL 1004761, at *1–2 (Mar. 25, 1994); see 
also U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032497, at *1 (July 17, 1995) (noting 
that if all of the factors are met the students are not considered employees). 
 69  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2006 WL 1094598, at *4 (Apr. 6, 2006). 
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the productive work performed by the interns would be offset 
by the burden to the employer from the training and 
supervision provided.”70 
However, courts have found that even if the entity 
providing the opportunity obtains some benefit, that does not 
necessarily mean that persons availing themselves of the 
opportunity are employees.71  For example, in Portland 
Terminal the railroad was benefitted to the extent that by 
training brakemen it created a qualified pool of potential 
employees.  Rather than looking to whether the alleged 
employer obtained any benefit, the courts that more narrowly 
view the issue to instead ask whether the “employer” obtained 
any “immediate benefit.”72 
The Court clearly relied on the fact that the railroad did not 
receive any immediate benefit in coming to the conclusion that 
the trainees were not employees: “Accepting the unchallenged 
findings here that the railroads receive no ‘immediate 
advantage’ from any work done by the trainees, we hold that 
they are not employees within the Act’s meaning.”73 Some 
courts have looked to this language finding that the question of 
immediate benefit becomes dispositive.  For example, Donovan 
v. American Airlines relied upon what it saw as “the simple and 
direct language of Justice Black’s opinion in Portland 
Terminal” to question (1) whether the trainee displaces other 
workers, and, (2) whether the company derives any immediate 
benefit from the trainee’s labor.74 
In contrast, other courts do not resolve the issue on the 
“immediate benefit” analysis, and have instead looked to see 
who is the “primary beneficiary” of the relationship.75  If it is 
the trainee, the balance tips in favor of finding that he is not an 
 
 70  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032473, at *1 (Mar. 13, 1995). 
 71  See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 72  See, e.g., Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787–88 (4th Cir. 1964). 
 73  Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947). 
 74  Donovan, 686 F.2d at 271–72.  The court also affirmed the district court’s 
finding that the trainees benefitted more than the company.  Id. at 272. 
 75  See, e.g., Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding chores 
required of boarding school student primarily benefitted the student); McLaughlin v. 
Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he general test used to determine if an 
employee is entitled to the protections of the Act is whether the employee or the 
employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor.”); Archie v. Grand Cent. 
P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding work by homeless persons in a 
training program benefitted employer more than the plaintiffs). 
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employee.  If it is the “employer,” the balance tips in favor of 
finding an employment relationship.  For example, in Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that the primary beneficiary analysis is the proper 
framework under Portland Terminal: 
We find that a primary benefit test provides a helpful 
framework for discerning employee status in learning or 
training situations. By focusing on the benefits flowing to 
each party, the test readily captures the distinction the FLSA 
attempts to make between trainees and employees. See 
Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152 (stating that FLSA is not 
intended to reach persons “who, without any express or 
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own 
advantage on the premises of another.”).76 
Solis, of course, does not directly deal with the language used 
by the Court in Portland Terminal, which other courts have 
relied upon in adopting the “immediate benefit” analysis.  
Perhaps the only court to recognize and directly address the 
issue was a district court in the Southern District of New York.  
In Wang v.  Hearst Corp.,77 the court pointed out that the 
dispute between “immediate benefit” and “primary beneficiary” 
analysis was rooted in the language used by the Court in 
Portland Terminal: 
Although the Supreme Court held in Walling that the men in 
that case were not employees because the defendant railroads 
received “no immediate advantage” from the trainees, 330 
U.S. at 153, it does not logically follow that the reverse is 
true, i.e. that the presence of an “immediate advantage” alone 
creates an employment relationship under the FLSA. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reading of Walling as establishing the 
test for an employer-employee relationship solely based on 
“direct or immediate benefit” is misplaced. There is no one-
dimensional test; rather, the prevailing view is the totality of 
circumstances test.78 
 The court’s simple yet sound conclusion is compelling. 
Complete reliance on the immediate benefit test is simply 
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances test. And 
because the “economic reality” or totality of the circumstances 
 
 76  Solis, 642 F.3d at 529. 
 77  Wang v.  Hearst Corp, 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 78  Id. at 493. 
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test has been clearly embraced by the Supreme Court itself,79 
the only explanation for the “immediate advantage” language 
used in Portland Terminal is that it was relevant to that case 
(there was no immediate advantage to the railroad). The Court 
simply was not saying that someone receiving training would 
be an employee if the company providing the training receives 
some immediate benefit. 
C. Recent Cases in the Context of Post-Secondary Education 
In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., the Eleventh 
Circuit considered whether unpaid externs who were required 
to complete an externship as part of their medical coding and 
billing studies were actually employees.80 The plaintiffs argued 
that the work was repetitive, they received little educational 
benefit, and that they conferred an economic benefit upon the 
employer.81 The court applied the factors in the Fact Sheet and 
concluded that the students: (a) received similar training to 
that offered by a school, (b) satisfied a requirement of 
graduation, thereby benefitting personally, (c) were supervised 
closely and did not displace other workers.82 The court further 
held that the employer did not receive an immediate 
advantage; indeed, its operations were impeded by the 
training.83 Accordingly, a grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the employer was upheld.84 The court was not required to 
decide if some advantage to the employer would have been 
sufficient to invoke the Act.85 
Two recent district court cases in the Southern District of 
 
 79  See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 
(1985).  Indeed, even before Portland Terminal was decided, the Supreme Court 
recognized that something might be done both for the benefit of a worker and for a 
company, and held that it was compensable if it was primarily for the benefit of the 
employer.  See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 
590, 599, 603 (1944). 
 80  504 F. App’x at 832–33. 
 81  Id. at 833. 
 82  Id. at 835. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Cooperative education programs (with arrangements like that in Kaplan) 
would seem to be the paradigmatic case for not considering students employees.  Thus, 
fire protection technology students enrolled in a community college, who received part 
of their training and experience in a fire protection district, were not considered 
employees after application of the six-factor test.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1986 
WL 1171130, at *1–2 (Mar. 27, 1986). 
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New York considered whether college student interns are 
within the coverage of the Act. One case, Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures Inc., concluded that the interns were 
really employees entitled to the protections of the Act.86 The 
other case, Wang v. Hearst Corp. discussed above, determined 
that a trial would be necessary using a “totality of the 
circumstances” test.87  Both district courts certified the issue of 
the proper test to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,88 which 
granted leave to consider both cases in a consolidated appeal.89 
In Glatt, the district court rejected application of the 
“primary beneficiary” test.90 Instead, the court concluded that 
the trainee exception should be interpreted narrowly and the 
six factors in the Fact Sheet were entitled to deference as a 
reasonable interpretation by the agency charged with enforcing 
the statute.91 
In pertinent part, the work involved internships in the 
accounting and production departments on the film Black 
Swan.  The lead plaintiff worked in the accounting department 
for three months, later moving to the production department. 
Services that were performed while working with the 
accounting department included obtaining personnel 
documents, picking up paychecks, tracking and reconciling 
purchase orders and invoices, and obtaining signatures.92 
Production department work by the lead plaintiff and another 
intern included drafting cover letters, organizing file cabinets, 
running errands, assembling furniture, making travel 
arrangements, taking lunch orders, removing trash, answering 
phones, and making deliveries.93 
Analyzing the factors suggested in the Fact Sheet, the court 
evaluated whether the benefits were to the intern resulting in 
academic or vocational training; building a résumé, gaining 
 
 86  Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 87  Wang v. The Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 88  Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 1:11-cv-06784-WHP, 2013 WL 
5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013); Wang v. Hearst Corp., 2013 WL 3326650, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013). 
 89  Wang, No. 13-2616 (2d Cir. Nov. 27, 2013); Glatt, No. 13-2467 (2d Cir. Nov. 
27, 2013).  As of this writing, briefing and argument have yet to occur in these appeals. 
 90  Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 531–32. Under the primary beneficiary test, the intern 
would not be considered an employee if the benefits to the intern outweighed those to 
the company. 
 91  Id. at 532. 
 92  Id. at 533. 
 93  Id. 
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references, versus the incidental benefits of learning the 
operation of an office.94 The court concluded that the internship 
was for the benefit of the employer, where the internship did 
not impede its operations, and resulted in an immediate 
advantage to the employer.95 Had the interns not performed 
these tasks, the employer would have had to hire others; thus 
the interns displaced other workers.96 The court highlighted the 
complete lack of training comparable to what one would receive 
in an academic or vocational program, as well as the 
comparable work received by employees and interns.97 
In contrast to Glatt, the district court in Wang v. Hearst 
Corp. used the “totality of the circumstances” test—including 
which party is the primary recipient of benefits—to determine 
whether an unpaid intern was an employee.98 As previously 
discussed, the court carefully explained why the presence of an 
immediate advantage to the employer does not automatically 
create an employment relationship.99 The court reasoned that 
the six factors in the Fact Sheet provided a framework for 
analysis based on Skidmore deference, but were not 
conclusive.100 The court rejected “a winner-take-all test,” and 
because the employer had shown “some educational training, 
some benefit to individual interns, some supervision, and some 
impediment to [its] regular operations,” the court found that 
summary judgment was improper and that a jury should 
resolve the issue.101 
Unpaid internships are common in media industries and a 
national media company may have hundreds of interns 
 
 94  Id. at 534. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. at 533. 
 97  Id. at 534. 
 98  Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 493–94. 
 101  Id. at 494.  To the extent a totality of the circumstances test applies and the 
six-factor test in the Fact Sheet is pertinent, summary judgment for either the 
employer or the intern  may be difficult to obtain. For example, in Griffiths v. Parker, 
the plaintiff performed clerical duties for a lawyer for several months and thereafter 
claimed she was an employee. 2014 WL 2095205, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2014). The 
lawyer contended that she was an unpaid intern seeking to become a paralegal, though 
she was not enrolled in any formal course of study.  Id. The court determined that a 
trial was necessary to determine whether the training benefitted the trainee or the 
employer, whether the trainee displaced an employee given the office staffing history, 
and whether the parties contemplated whether the trainee would be uncompensated. 
Id. at *5–6. 
Tepper Holt, Edited v.2.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/3/15  3:17 PM 
346 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2015 
working in a variety of departments. Under the FLSA, these 
cases may proceed as a collective action given a showing of a 
common unlawful policy, which should not be difficult to make 
given a national employer with an internship program.102  Of 
course, the certification procedure could multiply liability by 
allowing all interns subject to the allegedly unlawful policy to 
opt in.103 
In addition to federal and state unpaid wage claims, these 
cases also may involve claims of employment discrimination 
which may affect how the case is perceived by a jury (potential 
employer exploitation) and settlement value. By way of 
example, Alladin v. Paramount Management, LLC, involves an 
unpaid intern who performed secretarial tasks for two weeks 
and thereafter was paid $300 per week regardless of hours 
worked.104 She brought federal claims for unpaid wages and 
overtime as well as race discrimination.105 Although the 
defendant admitted that the intern was an “employee,” the 
district court clarified why the two-week internship was 
employment.106 The court considered the nature of the tasks 
performed, such as “sending packages, answering phones, 
making coffee, running errands, and performing other 
administrative tasks,” the absence of any training or benefit 
beyond that provided to employees, the immediate advantage 
to the employer, and the fact that the employer received the 
primary benefit.107 
Though the wages at stake may be relatively small, it is 
 
 102  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2014). Thus, conditional certification to 
proceed as a FLSA action was granted in Glatt and Wang. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 538–39; 
Wang, 2012 WL 2864524, at *1–3; see also Grant v. Warner Music Group, 2014 WL 
1918602, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014) (granting motion for court-authorized notice). 
In Grant, the plaintiffs claim that they and 3,000 other unpaid interns should have 
been paid given that they performed work similar to paid employees, received little or 
no supervision, and received neither academic credit nor compensation for at least part 
of the time. Id. at *2, *4–5. On the other hand, in Fraticelli v. MSG Holdings, L.P., the 
court determined that the action could not proceed as a collective action given that the 
interns worked in about 100 different departments with varying experiences. 2014 WL 
1807105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014). 
 103  In O’Jeda v. Viacom, Inc., the district court left open the possibility that after 
discovery the defendant could seek to de-certify and dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs if not 
similarly situated.  2014 WL 1344604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 2014). 
 104  Alladin v. Paramount Management, LLC, 2013 WL 4526002, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 27, 2013). 
 105  Race-discrimination is actionable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2014). 
 106  Alladin, 2013 WL 4526002, at *3. 
 107  Id. 
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likely to be less expensive to settle a case than to litigate it.  
Thus, in Bickerton v. Rose, a class action claiming PBS host 
Charlie Rose and his production company utilized unpaid 
interns in violation of federal and state law, defendants 
reportedly settled for an estimated $110,000, with interns 
receiving $110 per week for up to ten weeks and the rest going 
to attorneys’ fees.108 Given the potential for collective action, an 
employer may want to consider an early offer of judgment (with 
attorney’s fees and costs) to an FLSA plaintiff.109 As a 
preventive measure, an employer may want to add an 
arbitration provision to the internship agreement so as to 
minimize downside risk of a collective action and the expense of 
litigation.110 
IV. ARE UNPAID INTERNSHIPS ETHICAL? 
As noted, an internship can offer an excellent opportunity 
to gain exposure to a profession and work with outstanding 
individuals. It is a popular option among students.  At the 
same time, there are obvious concerns about exploitation and 
access. Concerning the former, in the absence of monetary 
compensation, an intern should receive useful training that 
will supplement formal education. For example, many students 
receive college credit for internships, paid or unpaid. 
 
 108  Bickerton v. Rose, No. 650780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 14, 2012); Amanda 
Becker, Charlie Rose Settles with Unpaid Interns as Lawsuits Spread, REUTERS (July 
1, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/entertainment-us-interns-lawsuit-
charlie-idUSBRE9601E820130701. 
 109  Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.  In Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1528–29, the Court 
did not decide whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies a 
plaintiff’s FLSA claims can moot the individual claim when collective action allegations 
remain. It did hold that if the individual FLSA claim is moot and no other plaintiffs 
have opted in, the action is moot notwithstanding collective action allegations. Id. at 
1529. In those circumstances, a FLSA plaintiff has no personal interest in representing 
others. Id. 
 110  There is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Am. 
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–09 (2013). Courts are expected to 
enforce arbitration agreements consistent with their terms.  Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. 
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). Statutory claims are subject to arbitration absent a 
contrary legislative directive. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 
(2012).  Courts have repeatedly held that an enforceable arbitration agreement may 
cover both individual and collective FLSA claims. See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield 
Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1334–37 (11th Cir. 2014); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 295–99 (2d Cir. 2013); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 
362 F.3d 294, 297–300 (5th Cir. 2004); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319–
20 (9th Cir. 1996); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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However, there is still a fairness aspect. Asking someone to 
do all of the work of a paid employee (but without the pay) for 
any significant length of time takes undue advantage of the 
disparity in bargaining power between the internship holder 
and seeker.  This proves too much, no matter how beneficial 
the training or career opportunities.111 
To provide equal access to internship opportunities, unpaid 
internships should be announced broadly Further, schools 
should verify that employers have and abide by clear anti-
discrimination policies that govern their selection process and 
supervision of interns, particularly where applicability of anti-
discrimination statutes is an open question given lack of 
remuneration. 
Many students simply may not be able to afford to complete 
an unpaid internship or pay for extra college credits. However, 
this concern accompanies many extracurricular activities 
(study abroad comes to mind) and does not seem a valid reason 
to discourage unpaid internships.112 
V. BETTER INTERNSHIPS AND AVOIDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
Based upon the cases and the six factors in the Fact Sheet, 
employers are well advised to consider whether an 
arrangement constitutes an employment relationship and to 
maintain adequate record keeping to verify their good faith 
efforts. Because the protections of the Act cannot be waived, an 
employer should consider the potential exposure from a claim if 
the internship was in fact subject to the Act. 
If an employer has many unpaid internship positions, the 
possibility of a collective action and subsequent liability for 
attorney’s fees magnifies this concern.  While the primary 
benefit test seems more consistent with “economic reality” and 
would encompass the considerable intangible benefits often 
 
 111  This seems particularly true when the internship is subsequent to 
graduation.  See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1988 WL 1534561, at *1–2 (Jan. 28, 
1988) (noting that an after-graduation internship would not meet the six-factor test); 
see also Paul Campos, A Judge Searches for Free Labor, SALON (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/11/21/a_judge_searches_for_free_labor/ (criticizing offer of 
one-year, post-graduate gratuitous service appointment). 
 112  Cf. Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 
1993) (“Nor is it dispositive that the trainees made financial sacrifices in order to 
attend the academy. A vocational or associate degree program in fire science would 
have entailed similar burdens.”) 
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gained from an internship,113 the six factors contained in the 
Fact Sheet are still important, particularly if a court insists on 
full compliance with each factor. 
Given the uncertainty, an employer should also document 
the decision-making process to establish its good faith effort to 
comply with the law as understood. This includes cataloguing 
the transferable skills the intern should learn114 and 
supporting evidence that placing an intern in the organization 
is not a means to reduce hours of existing staff or avoid hiring 
additional employees. The training program must be more than 
the work itself, particularly where the provider will obtain an 
economic advantage. Merely imparting basic job skills, such as 
attendance, sustained effort, and the like will not be enough no 
matter how laudable the program.115 
Moreover, merely performing “entry level” routine tasks 
will not suffice.116 Special precaution should be taken when the 
provider and the intern have a social relationship apart from 
the internship.117 
 
 113  The primary benefit test better recognizes that relationships often involve 
mutual benefits and rarely are internships completely one-sided. It also promotes 
internships; a test that is too complex and difficult to satisfy will discourage most 
employers who might otherwise be willing to explore an unpaid internship. 
 114  The Department of Labor has indicated: 
Where educational or training programs are designed to provide students with 
professional experience in the furtherance of their education and the training is 
academically oriented for the benefit of the students, it is our position that the 
students will not be considered employees of the institution to which they are 
assigned, provided the six criteria referred to above are met. For example, where 
certain work activities are performed by students that are but an extension of 
their academic programs, we would not assert that an employer-employee 
relationship exists for the purposes of the FLSA. In situations where students 
receive college credits applicable toward graduation when they volunteer to 
perform internships under a college program, and the program involves the 
students in real life situations and provides the students with educational 
experiences unobtainable in a classroom setting, we do not believe that an 
employment relationship exists between the students and the facility providing 
the instruction. Where there is no employment relationship under the FLSA, the 
minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA have no application . . . . 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1996 WL 1031777, at *1–2 (May 8, 1996); U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032496, at *1–2 (July 11, 1995). Indicating what work 
activities fulfill the academic objectives and what experiences are not available in a 
classroom would seem paramount. 
 115  See Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 116  See Okoro v. Pyramid 4 Aegis, 2012 WL 1410025, at *10 (E.D. Wis. April 23, 
2012). 
 117  See id. (finding a personal relationship with the employer is no bar to holding 
that the plaintiff was an employee); Griffiths v. Parker, 2014 WL 2095205, at *1, *5 
(May 20, 2014) (same; defendant claimed that he accommodated plaintiff’s boyfriend in 
allowing her to help out in defendant’s office). 
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The design of an unpaid internship should make it clear 
that there is a benefit to the student through learning 
transferable skills, not just general office procedure. This can 
be accomplished through an academic component for college 
credit. The internship could be structured around a college 
course (perhaps dealing with internships) rather than the 
workplace. Ideally, the internship incorporates course 
objectives, measurable outcomes, and student deliverables. The 
learning component may be demonstrated by staff supervision 
of the intern and meaningful work.118 
Merely learning about the business is not enough.119 
Execution is also important. For example, in Marshall v. 
Baptist Hospital, Inc., the court affirmed a finding that a 
hospital was the primary beneficiary of a student clinical 
arrangement in no small part due to a deficient training 
program that shortchanged the students.120 Given the 
requirement of an educational component, care must be taken 
in internships of limited duration, for example, four weeks as 
opposed to six months, to work closely with the coordinating 
academic institution. 
Useful unpaid internships require a commitment upon the 
part of the employer to supervise and work with the interns, 
thereby impeding the operations of the employer.  It requires a 
time commitment, i.e., the intern “shadowing” a staff member.  
However, the suggestion that interns cannot work 
independently on the same projects as the paid staff 
overreaches.121 After all, the essential subject matter of the 
internship is exposure to work customarily done in the 
profession. 
Once the structure of the internship is determined, the 
employer should commit to a fixed duration. It would also be 
useful to document that the student’s decision to accept an 
unpaid internship was voluntary and consensual.122 In 
addition, it is important to clarify that the internship includes 
 
 118  See Griffiths, 2014 WL 2095205, at *3–4 
 119  See Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding employees 
were subject to the Act even though employer claimed they were learning the 
business). 
 120  668 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 121  See Yamada, supra note 66, at 233 (noting that the six-factor test “draws an 
unrealistic line between ‘training’ and ‘work’”). 
 122  Though waiver of FLSA protection is not a complete defense to possible 
liability. 
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no guarantee of a job afterward. Finally, if employers are not in 
a position to create an internship whose primary benefit is to 
the intern, and the potential for liability is too great, employers 
should wisely pass on offering unpaid internships. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Internships can provide students with invaluable practical 
experience and skills, and provide employers with the 
opportunity to give back. When schools and employers 
collaborate effectively, they can create successful internships 
even under the Portland Terminal factors. 
Despite these advantages and the popularity of internships 
with students and schools, employers must carefully consider 
whether the unpaid internships comply with the Act. If not, 
employers face lurking liability under the FLSA for employees 
engaged in interstate commerce, specifically minimum wage, 
overtime, and record-keeping requirements.  Because the 
provisions of the Act cannot be waived, an employer faces 
considerable liability (and a potential collective action and 
liability for attorney’s fees) from an erroneous interpretation of 
the Act. 
The majority of federal circuit courts favor a “totality of the 
circumstances” test that considers which party receives the 
primary benefit from the internship, and hold that the Act is 
applicable only if the employer receives the primary benefit.  
Further, the majority do not find the fact that the employer 
receives an immediate benefit to be dispositive.123 
Though we argue Fact Sheet #71 should receive little 
deference, the factors identified by Department of Labor are 
important if only because they guide the courts’ decisions.  
Though the factors are not dispositive; they provide a 
framework, for the majority of courts, for analyzing the 
primary benefit question. 
Even assuming that unpaid internships fall within a safe 
harbor with respect to the Act, there are concerns about 
exploitation of free labor and uneven access to internship 
opportunities. These concerns can be remedied by structuring 
an internship to provide a valid educational benefit over a 
 
 123  See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–1027 
(10th Cir. 1993). 
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limited period, and by taking care to broadly publicize the 
availability of the opportunity. Further, schools must ensure 
that non-discrimination policies are followed both in the 
selection process and subsequent supervision by employers. 
Internships can provide invaluable practical experience and 
skills. By collaborating effectively and being mindful to the 
Portland Terminal factors schools and employers can continue 
to create and administer successful internships programs. 
